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when every treatment with the exception of palliative care 
has been stopped. Though occasionally it is one particu-
lar symptom that causes severe, even extreme suffering, in 
most cases patients have to cope with the combined effects 
of multiple symptoms. Their suffering may also be aggra-
vated by events in their own life, the loss of a partner for 
example, or even by the memories of traumatizing events 
in their youth or of personal failings during the course of 
their life.
The alleviation of suffering is traditionally considered 
one of the main aims of medicine. But when Eric Cassell 
published his classical paper on the nature of suffering and 
the goals of medicine in 1982,1 medical literature had for a 
long time been almost silent about the phenomenon. In the 
wake of the palliative care movement a substantial number 
of empirical studies of suffering, in particular of suffering 
at the end of life, has been published since then, the flow of 
such papers accelerating in recent years. This paper is 
based on a sample of such studies that, because of their 
many similarities, may be considered representative of the 
literature. Almost all these studies refer to Cassell, and in 
particular to his ‘definition’ of suffering. So it seems fitting 
to start (“Cassell on suffering” section) by considering Cas-
sell’s views in some detail. In this discussion I will make a 
number of conceptual points that I will rely on in later 
sections.
In a second step (“Empirical work on suffering” section) 
I will consider the new empirical work on suffering in the 
end-stage of life. All authors accept Cassell’s point that 
suffering is not merely a matter of pain and other physical 
symptoms, but in addition has psychological, existential 
and social dimensions. In other respects, however, as I will 
show, they only pay lip-service to Cassell’s authority.
1 Cassell (1982). Included in Cassell (1991).
Abstract In recent years a large empirical literature has 
appeared on suffering at the end of life. In this literature 
it is recognized that suffering has existential and social 
dimensions in addition to physical and psychological ones. 
The non-physical aspects of suffering, however, are still 
understood as pathological symptoms, to be reduced by 
therapeutical interventions as much as possible. But suffer-
ing itself and the negative emotional states it consists of are 
intentional states of mind which, as such, make cognitive 
claims: they are more or less appropriate responses to the 
actual circumstances of the patient. These circumstances 
often are such that it would rather be a pathological symp-
tom not to be sad and not to suffer. Suffering, therefore, is 
sometimes and to some extent a condition to be respected. 
Although I do not dispute that the alleviation of suffering 
is the main aim of palliative care, in pursuing that aim we 
should acknowledge a constraint of realism.
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Outline
Suffering is an all-too-common experience in human life, 
in all its phases. But it looms particularly large at the end 
of life, for patients dying from a lethal illness like cancer, 
in particular during the days, weeks or months that follow 
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The main criticism that I will make of this literature 
("The constraint of realism" section) goes beyond Cassell’s 
own views, although it builds on them. Cassell conceives of 
suffering as ‘a specific state of severe distress related to the 
imminent, perceived or actual, threat to the integrity or 
existential continuity of the person’.2 This means that suf-
fering is an attitude vis-à-vis a certain state of affairs, that 
is understood to endanger the person’s life, his identity or 
his social role. If that person perceives her situation as 
threatening, it is always a relevant question whether she has 
understood that situation correctly. Suffering is therefore 
not a brute mental fact that can simply be established by 
introspection, rather it is normally an occasion for reflec-
tion, for the person herself and her intimates. Is my situa-
tion really as threatening as I perceive it to be, and how can 
I best cope with that threat? I do not deny that professional 
care-givers could play a modest role in this dialogue, pro-
viding support and, sometimes, consolation. But they mis-
interpret that role if they understand it as consisting of 
‘spiritual interventions or therapies’, exclusively aimed at 
the alleviation of the patient’s suffering. The patient’s 
actual situation can be such that he would have to live in a 
world of illusion in order not to suffer. To the extent that 
grief, sadness and other negative emotional states are 
appropriate responses to the actual circumstances in which 
the patient finds himself, they are not to be considered 
‘symptoms’ of a pathology, to be fighted at all costs.
In “An illustration: dignity therapy” section I will illus-
trate my criticism by discussing the famous ‘dignity ther-
apy’, developed by Harvey Chochinov and his associates. 
In "Some major elements of suffering" section I will con-
sider some important dimensions of suffering at the end of 
life in order both to further specify that criticism, but also 
to nuance it. In considering the facts as they are we should 
consider them from the personal perspective of the patient, 
even when that perspective as such is vulnerable to criti-
cism. And when suffering reaches a peak where the patient 
is helpless in the face of an overwhelming force, we should 
no longer be scrupulous about selling him illusions.
Suffering, I will conclude ("Conclusion" section), is 
sometimes and to some extent a condition that requires to 
be respected. I do not dispute that the alleviation of suf-
fering is the main aim of palliative care for the dying. But 
pursuing that aim should remain within the boundaries of a 
constraint of realism.
The direct object of my criticism is a certain literature, 
the new empiricial literature on the dimensions of suffer-
ing, not the general literature on palliative care, nor it’s 
practice. Although the views that I criticize are fairly com-
mon in practice as well, I am sure that many doctors and 
2 Cassell (1982, p. 640, 1991, p. 33, 1999, p. 531).
nurses try to find an equilibrium between relieving suffer-
ing and respecting suffering. My aim is to explain why this 
is the right attitude.
Cassell on suffering
As we saw Cassell conceives of suffering as being dis-
tressed by circumstances understood as threats to one’s 
person. The term ‘distress’ obviously refers to a state of 
consciousness. If something happens that you consider 
undesirable, you only suffer from the event if you expe-
rience its occurrence or its effects with grief and sorrow. 
These are negative emotions, but their negative character 
is not enough for recognizing you to suffer. You should 
understand the event or it effects as endangering the core of 
your personhood.
This means that suffering is an intentional state, not 
merely a sensation with a certain tonality. In this respect it 
is similar to happiness.3 All intentional states have two 
aspects: the state itself and its object. If you believe, hope, 
fear or desire, there has to be something that you believe, 
hope for, fear or desire. This something can be unpacked as 
a proposition: you believe that something is the case, or 
you hope, fear or desire that it will be. Many such states 
involve cognitive claims: if that ‘something’ is not really 
the case, your belief is false; and if there is no reason at all 
to expect it to happen, your hope and your fear are inappro-
priate. (But not your desire: if your desire doesn’t fit the 
world, it is rather the world that is ‘at fault’4.) Suffering 
may involve a whole range of negative emotions: in addi-
tion to grief and sorrow, anxious concern, fear, anger, 
despair, frustration, bitterness, guilt, embarassment, shame. 
These emotions all have their own cognitive element: you 
are angry because you think that people are unfair to you, 
or Fate is, you are desperate because something that is 
extremely dear to you is irrevocably escaping you. But suf-
fering, according to Cassell, has a cognitive aspect of its 
own: it implies the belief that your personhood is funda-
mentally threatened.
As Cassell explains in his topology of personhood, the 
threat may be directed at different aspects of your person.5 
Most basically, you may consider your biological life to be 
at stake, and even if you don’t attribute any inherent value 
to being barely alive, it is a necessary condition of 
3 On every understanding of happiness, even a hedonist one, cf. Feld-
man (2010, chs. 6–7).
4 Cf. Anscombe (1963, 56) on what has come to be called the direc-
tion-of-fit criterion for classifying intentional states (and speech acts).
5 In this paragraph I do not aim to summarize Cassell’s topology but 
reorder it in anticipation of my discussion in § 6.
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everything else that is valuable to you about your life. Your 
illness and its effects may also endanger you as the subject 
of the story of your life, by making it difficult or impossible 
for you to go on contributing to causes that gave meaning 
and coherence to that story. Perhaps even more fundamen-
tally it may endanger you as a person having a life of her 
own to live at all, by invading your daily routines and cor-
roding your intimate relationships. You may also feel that 
you are no longer your normal self in other social contacts, 
because you are losing the essential elements that deter-
mine your role and status in those contacts: the person you 
are, and the person you think you are, in the eyes of others. 
As a result your self-esteem may be endangered as well. In 
all these respects there is a growing disparity between what 
you are accustomed to do and to be and what you find your-
self to be able to do and to be.
Suffering never consists of pain, dyspnea, nausea, 
fatigue or other physical symptoms alone. Pain, for exam-
ple, is an element of suffering, not merely a cause, but in 
order to know, when someone is in pain, whether she is 
also suffering, we have to understand what the pain means 
to her. The pain in childbirth, to cite the standard-example, 
may be extreme, but it is rarely considered an element of 
suffering. Pain of the same severity would definitely be an 
element of suffering if it didn’t announce a new life but 
death. It is not only the case that the meaning of the pain 
determines to what extent you are suffering, it even deter-
mines the nature of the sensation itself: how painful the 
pain really is. If you learn that the pain you are feeling dur-
ing an operation will be over in a minute, it is already less 
biting. On the other hand, fear and anxiety can intensify 
restlessness, vomiting, sleep disturbance and other physical 
symptoms.6
If we understand suffering in the way Cassell proposes, 
it can never be a good argument, in assessing someone’s 
suffering from a certain disease, to say that other people 
who are in exactly the same physiological condition, do not 
suffer, or do not suffer severely. For whether this condition 
can intelligibly be perceived by someone as endangering 
her integrity as a person, will depend on the person she is, 
her character, her life history and her values. An amputa-
tion may mean something completely different to you when 
you have been a dancer all your life than when you have 
been an arm-chair philosopher. In this sense suffering is a 
subjective matter.7
6 Wall and Melzack (1999, ch. 1).
7 Cassell, however, seems to understand it as a subjective matter in a 
stronger sense: as something that is only accessible to the subject and 
can be established by her with final authority. Even people who know 
her person, her biography and her views and can take into account her 
behaviour and body language, have no independent access. For criti-
cism of that view see Wijsbek (2012).
Empirical work on suffering
The new literature on suffering, mainly focussing on the 
end-stage of life, aims to provide us with an organized list 
of elements of suffering, informing us for each element 
about its incidence, and sometimes also giving us scores for 
the average severity of the suffering on that particular 
dimension. Such lists are only meant to offer a checklist for 
understanding the specific nature of a person’s suffering, 
they are not supposed to be usable for calculating an overall 
score of the severity of that suffering. Usually the elements 
are grouped into four classes: physical symptoms, psycho-
logical, existential and interpersonal or social dimensions 
of suffering.8 This standard classification, however, is not 
very stable: the same or similar aspects are often differently 
classified.9
On closer look the so-called physical symptoms are all 
mental states. They are only different from other sensations 
and perceptions because of their relation to a more or less 
clear bodily location. If it itches, it itches somewhere. 
Coughing, vomiting and bodily disfigurements are forms of 
suffering because of the way these physical states and 
events are experienced. Some symptoms mentioned on the 
lists are clearly perceptions, for example smelling unpleas-
ant, others seem to be mere sensations, for example 
itching.10
When Cassell wrote his paper, it was common for doc-
tors to understand the very term ‘suffering’ to refer to pain. 
Although this is no longer true, many doctors still have a 
narrow focus on physical symptoms.11 Some studies have 
found that physical symptoms are the most important ele-
ments of suffering, in terms of incidence and of average 
severity.12 But according to most studies the non-physio-
logical elements are more important. The second conclu-
sion seems to be confirmed by the findings of studies of the 
reasons people have for requesting physician assistance to 
8 Cherny et al. (1994) seem to have introduced this fourfold classifi-
cation.
9 For example, anxiety as a physical or as a psychological symptom. 
For other examples see Footnotes 20, 21 and 22.
10 It is disputed whether pain is a mere sensation normally caused 
by tissue damage or a perception of injury, see the introduction to 
Aydede (2006), or the same author’s entry ‘Pain’ in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
11 As a substantial number of Dutch doctors still do in assessing 
‘unbearable suffering’ in the case of a request for euthanasia (Van Tol 
et al. 2010, 2011, 130–134; Pasman et al. 2009).
12 Benedict (1989), Kuupelomäki and Lauri (1998), Wilson et  al. 
(2004), Wilson et al. (2007). Krikorian et al. (2012, p. 800), refer to 
a Spanish study by Maté, reporting that most caregivers attribute a 




end their lives. Existential and social concerns are often 
more prominent on these lists than physical symptoms.13
The list of possible physical symptoms is very long,14 
but the most prominent seem to be: fatigue, pain, breath-
lessness and nausea. Fatigue (including weakness, exhaus-
tion, cachexia) seems generally to be the most common.15 
An important finding is that even for patients who we may 
assume to receive the best possible palliative care, for 
example in a hospice, it is not uncommon that they rate the 
pain and other symptoms they experience as severe.16 On 
the non-physiological dimensions the variation in the rele-
vant aspects is much greater. Understanding oneself to be a 
burden for others, for example, is very prominent on some 
lists but absent on others.17 But, if one goes through a sub-
stantial number of these research reports, a fairly coherent 
picture of the most important dimensions emerges. (See 
§ 6) It is confirmed by the studies of the reasons for request-
ing physician-assisted death.
As I said, almost all these studies refer to Cassell, and 
one idea that they have all learned from him is that suffer-
ing cannot exhaustively be described in terms of physical 
symptoms. But in other respects they are not at all true to 
his insights. This is particularly true of the studies that do 
not only give lists of elements of suffering, but try to meas-
ure their importance. If, for example, a person is extremely 
tired, it will be difficult for her to engage in meaningful 
activities, to take care of her own needs or even to find a 
way of coping mentally with her condition. Fatigue makes 
the hard work of dying even harder. So when we ask her to 
tell us how important fatigue is as an element of her suffer-
ing, do we mean: fatigue as such, abstracting from these 
13 Van der Wal et  al. (2005, 51), Pearlman et  al. (2005), Ganzini 
et al. (2009), Pasman et al. (2009), Dees et al. (2011), Oregon Public 
Health Division (2014), Washington Death with Dignity Act Report 
(2014), cf. Dees et al. (2010) for a review of relevant studies. Excep-
tions include Meier et al. (1998), Wilson et al. (2007), Deliëns et al. 
(2011, chs 19–20). Note that we cannot assume that all patients who 
request physician assistance suffer severely.
14 The most detailed list, in Ruijs et al. (2009), contains 37 items, but 
some of these (feeling tense, depressed, anxious) are clearly misclas-
sified.
15 Except for ‘general malaise’ or ‘general discomfort’ in a number 
of studies, e.g. Morita a.o. (2004). Kwon et al. (2006) found that pain 
was the most common and severe symptom, but fatigue the most 
interfering in patients’ lives. According to Oi-Ling et al. (2005) car-
egivers and physicians agreed with patients on the distress involved in 
most symptoms, but underrated fatigue and cachexia.
16 According to Baines and Norlander (2000), for example, 26% of 
hospice patients reported moderate, 24% severe pain in the last 24 h.
17 It is the most important non-physiological dimension of suffer-
ing according to Wilson et al. (2004), cf. Singer et al. (1999), but is 
not mentioned by Oi-Ling et al. (2005), or by Lloyd-Williams et al. 
(2008). McPherson et  al. (2007) argue that it is an element of suf-
fering that is systematically underrated by professional and informal 
caregivers.
further effects? If that is what we mean, we do not really 
accept Cassell’s point that in order to determine the sever-
ity of a person’s suffering from fatigue we have to consider 
to what extent this physical symptom is understood as 
threatening. But if we are prepared to take these further 
effects into account, we are already measuring a psycholog-
ical or existential dimension of suffering, not a mere physi-
cal symptom.18
Making listst of elements can only be the first step in 
understanding suffering. In order to really understand it we 
have to consider the interplay of these elements. If your 
pain is rated as an important element of suffering because it 
interferes with your activities, that effect may be reinforced 
by your sense that these activities have lost their point any-
way. If you are already suffering from losses of meaning 
and of autonomy because of further losses of sight, hearing 
and mobility, that effect can be multiplied by fatigue and by 
fear. Hence we cannot assess the extent of a person’s suffer-
ing by considering the elements of suffering one by one, let 
alone by scoring their severity one by one.19 Holism is an 
essential characteristic of Cassell’s conception of suffering.
An additional problem of using measuring scales is 
the problem of interpersonal comparability. Perhaps the 
person who gives his suffering the highest possible score 
today will discover tomorrow that it can still become much 
worse. So how do we know that the same score indicates a 
comparable level of suffering?
A final common weakness of the existing studies is that 
they don’t recognize the dual nature of suffering as an 
intentional state. Some of the items on their lists only refer 
to the subjective side of the intentional state, others to such 
states identified by their object, or even only to the 
18 Yun et al. (2006) differentiate between the incidence and severity 
of the symptom and its interference in the life of the patient (general 
activity, mood, work, relation, walking and enjoyment). The model of 
dignity developed by Van Gennip et al. (2013), distinguishes between 
illness-related conditions (physical symptoms, functional/cognitive 
ability, appearance) and their effects on ‘personal dignity’.
19 In various studies, e.g. Benedict (1989), Byock and Merriman 
(1998), Holland (1999/2014) (the ‘distress thermometer’), Schulz 
et al. (2010), Ruijs et al. (2012), subjects have been asked to give a 
separate overall score of their suffering. It is then unclear how this 
overall score is supposed to be related to the scores on individual 
aspects. A mysterious finding of Ruijs et  al. (2012), for example, is 
that the number of people with an overall score of ‘serious or very 
serious suffering’ was lower than the number with the same score on 
some specific aspects. A very different measure of suffering is pro-
vided by the Pictorial Representation of Illness and Self-Measure 
(PRISM), developed by Büchi et al. (2002). Subjects are asked to put 
a red disk, representing their illness, on a yellow disk, representing 
their ‘Selves’. Suffering is measured by the distance between the cent-
ers of the disks: the Self-Illness Separation (SIS). As the authors note, 
this measure can be understood to correspond to Cassell’s conception 
of suffering.
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intentional objects as such. One study, for example, 
includes the following elements as ‘personal aspects of suf-
fering’: feelings of guilt, of worthlessness, of loneliness, of 
hopelessness, feeling no longer the same person, feeling 
tired of life, feeling dependent on others, feeling loss of 
control, feeling being a nuisance, feeling not important to 
others.20 All these ‘feelings’ are identified by their object. 
Another study lists the following emotions as ‘psychologi-
cal symptoms’: being afraid, worried or anxious, irritable, 
depressed, hopeless, sad, burden to others (sic), angry, 
lonely, embarrassed about oneself, guilty, abandoned, 
rejected.21 Most of these ‘feelings’ are described in purely 
subjective terms, but if we ask, what makes these people 
afraid, worried, angry, et cetera -referring by that question 
to the objects of those intentional states, not merely their 
causes-, the answers obviously are such things as: present 
or future dependence on the care of others, loneliness, 
being a burden to others, abandonment, rejection. This 
means that basically the same items may occur on the list 
within several classes, in particular as psychological and as 
social or existential elements.22
But the real problem is not only a matter of double 
counting or of an inaccurate system of classification. It 
goes much deeper.
The constraint of realism
That basic problem is the following. If you focus on the 
subjective side of the intentional state and not on the inten-
tional object, it becomes easy for you to treat all the ele-
ments of suffering in the same way as physical symptoms. 
The intentional objects are then only seen as accidental 
causes of suffering, the suffering itself is identified with the 
20 Ruijs et al. (2009). Chochinov et al. (2009) mention the following 
‘feelings’ among 25 aspects of distress in the terminally ill: feeling 
no longer who I was, feeling of not having control, feeling uncertain, 
feeling anxious, feeling of reduced privacy, feeling aburden to oth-
ers, feeling how your look has changed, feeling depressed, feeling of 
unfinished business, feeling life no longer has meaning or purpose, 
bot feeling worthwhile or valued, feeling not have made meaningful 
contribution, not feeling able to mentally fight illness, not feeling sup-
ported by health care providers or by friends and family. Ruijs et al. 
(2014) observes the overlap between categories of suffering but fails 
to explain it.
21 Schulz et al. (2010). Cf. Kuupelomäki and Lauri (1998): anxiety, 
depression, feelings of anger and guilt, aggressiveness, irritability, 
nervousness, and various fears and worries; de Haes et  al. (1990): 
irritability, worrying, depressed mood, nervousness, desperate feel-
ings about the future, tension, anxiety and concentration problems.
22 Although Schulz et al. (2010) combined measuring instruments for 
the domains of physical symptoms, psychological distress and exis-
tential or spiritual suffering in order “to compile a comprehensive set 
of non-overlapping items”.
subjective state which consists of all the physical and emo-
tional ‘symptoms’ taken together. Some of the earlier stud-
ies of ‘physical and psychological distress’ used only this 
simple dual classification.23 But even when ‘feelings’ are 
identified by their objects and classified as existential or 
social concerns, the understanding of suffering as a basi-
cally pathological state doesn’t change. Loss of faith is then 
simply one other item to be taken into account in determin-
ing one’s score on the ‘distress thermometer’, together with 
indigestion and constipation.24 The obvious aim of pallia-
tive care remains to reduce all symptoms, from whatever 
category, as much as possible. The checklists are supposed 
to enable us to concentrate our efforts on the relevant ele-
ments. They are instruments for diagnosis, ideally to be fol-
lowed by treatment. We could call this a purely functional 
approach to suffering: if we come across any case of suffer-
ing, we have a reason to do something about it.
This approach fails to recognize the cognitive aspect 
of all emotions, including the negative ones: they are all 
more or less adequate responses to the situation the person 
finds herself in. The same is true of suffering as an over-
all response to that situation. To give one example: many 
studies seem to use the term ‘depression’, either as an 
equivalent of ‘sadness’, or as an indication of a high degree 
of sadness. This suggests that sadness as such is a patho-
logical state that should always be attenuated as much as 
possible. But the essential characteristic of depression is 
being sad without loss, and when you are acutely aware 
of, for example, losing all options for meaningful activities 
and self-care, it would rather be pathological for you not 
to be sad. Sadness is by itself a mood, not a mood disor-
der, and hence not necessarily something to be avoided or 
minimized.
Even if you meet some other standard conditions of 
depression as listed in the DSM-V, that may also be some-
thing to be expected in the situation. Either your illness 
itself or its physical symptoms may already rob you of your 
sleep, but if reflection on your situation does so, that is not 
necessarily a sign of a psychiatric condition either. To rec-
ognize that negative emotions may be appropriate 
23 E.g. the Symptom Assessment Scale, Bruera et al. (1991), that is 
still widely used, cf. Richardson and Jones (2009).
24 Holland (1999/2014). Cf. the measurement scales for spiritual 




responses to reality could be called a realistic approach to 
suffering.25
Or consider fears for the future. Such fears may concern 
the further development of the illness with its accompa-
nying symptoms, possible treatment outcomes, including 
side-effects, as well as death. Fears may also be directed 
to increasing social stigma or isolation. Such fears may 
be exaggerated, and they often are, but they may be also 
be fully warranted. In that case they should not be treated 
as the expression of an ‘anxiety adjustment disorder’. We 
should rather consider what we can still do to prevent them 
from being fulfilled.
But why shouldn’t we take a purely functional approach? 
Would that not be much better from the point of view of the 
patient? After all, if we succeed in reducing his negative 
feelings, however appropriate, it would result in a higher 
level of happiness and well-being for him, a higher quality 
of life. Wouldn’t it?
That remains to be seen. A purely functional attitude 
could easily become counter-productive. By now that has 
generally been acknowledged for the attempt, once usual, 
to keep the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis a secret for 
him. That can result in torturing uncertainty and make it 
impossible for the patient to make wise choices as regards 
the withdrawing of treatment and forms of palliative care 
with side-effects for his level of consciousness. Generally 
speaking, bringing the patient in an artificially euphoric 
state may rob him of his sense of urgency for doing what 
his situation calls for, arranging his affairs, taking leave, 
perhaps transmitting family traditions, and most impor-
tantly, coming to terms with the end of his life.
But whether this really is all that important, depends on 
another question: what is a good life, and hence a good 
death, for a person? Is it only determined by the way in 
which she experiences the world, disregarding whether this 
experience is consonant with reality (experientialism)? 
This is a fundamental philosophical question on which a 
large literature has appeared. Well-known is Robert 
25 Kissane (2012) uses the terms ‘adaptive adjustment’ and ‘maldap-
tive response’ themselves in a purely functional way, for positive, 
resp. negative feelings and social environments. ‘Fear of being a bur-
den’, for example, is then always a ‘maladaptive response’, whether 
that fear is warranted or not. ‘Fulfilled life, with accomplishments and 
legacy’ is then always an ‘adaptive adjustment’, even for someone 
like Ivan Ilyich. Kissane et al. (2001), cf. Kissane et al. (2004) even 
argues for the recognition of a ‘demoralisation syndrome’ as a new 
psychiatric diagnosis, characterised by loss of meaning, dysphoria, 
disheartenment, helplessness and a sense of failure. Slavney (1999) 
objected that demoralization is not a psychiatric disorder at all, but a 
normal response to adversity. Chapman and Gavrin (1999) consider 
stress responses to be possibly beneficial when they are short-term 
responses to a negative stressor, because they prepare the subject for 
an emergency reaction, but always maladaptive when the stressor per-
sists.
Nozick’s thought experiment of the experience machine: 
neurologists have figured out a way to stimulate your brain 
to induce whatever pleasurable experiences you program to 
have. Once in the program you cannot distinguish between 
your experiences and those of real life. Would you prefer to 
be hooked on to he machine for the rest of your life, with 
only some interruptions giving you opportunities for repro-
gramming? 26
I cannot enter into a full discussion of this large issue, 
but I will appeal to what seems to me one conclusive argu-
ment against experientialism. Imagine a man who believes 
that he has a very good life: he is successful in his profes-
sional life and appreciated for his expertise by his col-
leagues, he has a loving partner, etcetera. But all this is 
untrue: his professional performance is bad, his colleagues 
ridicule him behind his back, his partner betrays him with a 
lover. Suppose that he continues in his false beliefs until his 
death. Has he had a good life?27 Thomas Nagel’s answer to 
the question is the following: we all agree that it would be 
very bad for this man to discover the truth. But how can it 
be bad for him to come to know the facts, if these facts are 
not bad for him in themselves?28 And by leaving him to live 
in his illusionary world, his colleagues and his partner 
bereave him of any opportunity to try to improve things. 
Only the truth can liberate us. It is therefore better to recog-
nize the facts as they are with sadness than to live in bliss-
ful denial of them.
Some supporters of a purely functional approach don’t 
call this realism but rationalism, and suggest that it betrays 
a typical Western overrating of cognitive abilities. But that 
suggestion on the one hand neglects the fact that emotional 
states are characterized by their cognitive content as much 
as by their felt quality (‘what it is like to be’ sad, angry, 
shameful etc.). On the other hand the suggestion doesn’t 
take into account that our cognitive abilities, including the 
ability to respond with adequate emotions, are the main 
resources we have at our disposal for coping with the vicis-
situdes of life, including the consequences of illness.
I do not deny that the alleviation of suffering is the most 
important aim of palliative care. If fatigue, pain, breathless-
ness, nausea can be reduced, that will reduce suffering as 
well, and by itself, abstracting from further side-effects, be 
only highly beneficial to the patient. He is no longer in a 
26 Nozick (1971, 1974, 42–45, 1989, 104–108). Although sugges-
tive, the question is less than fully compelling as an argument against 
experientialism because answers are sensitive to framing effects, and 
positive answers are not unknown.
27 Would Ivan Ilych have had a good life if he had suddenly died 
from a heart attack a day before the accident that lead to his terrible 
death?
28 Nagel (1970).
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state in which it matters that symptoms have a functional 
value of their own, that, for example, pain alerts to tissue 
damage and sickness helps to save energy. But as regards to 
the cognitive dimension of suffering, suffering as a 
response to a threatening situation, it should not be seen as 
merely consisting of such symptoms. Rather the adequacy 
of the response should be an object of reflection and of dia-
logue, with family and friends and, maybe, spiritual coun-
selors. Nurses and doctors can to some extent participate in 
this dialogue, in particular when the patient’s way of cop-
ing with his condition is relevant to medical decisions, per-
haps occasionally also outside the context of medical deci-
sion-making altogether, if such contacts are welcomed by 
the patient and are not considered to intrude into his private 
life. But when we talk with a fellow human being about his 
hopes and fears, the meaning of his life, his difficulties to 
accept his mortality or to preserve his self-respect, we are 
no longer involved in therapy.29
An illustration: dignity therapy
Harvey Chochinov is one of the researchers of end-of-life 
suffering who is most true to the person-oriented and holis-
tic character of Cassell’s programme.30 With his associates 
he has in particular done important research on loss of dig-
nity as a dimension of suffering. In response to these find-
ings they have developed a ‘psychotherapeutic interven-
tion’ that they call ‘dignity therapy’. Although I do not 
know to what extent the therapy is actually being used in 
palliative care, it certainly has become quite famous.31
Actually the aim of the intervention is much broader 
than to restore a sense of dignity and self-worth, it is also 
concerned with losses of purpose and meaning, the loss of 
hope, and even with the loss of the ability to cope with the 
effects of illness. Patients who consent to participate are 
offered the opportunity to address issues that matter most 
to them or speak to things that they would most want to 
be remembered for as death draws near. An edited tran-
script of these sessions is returned to the patients for them 
to share with individuals of their choosing. The discussion 
29 For similarly motivated reservations about palliative sedation 
(taking away the patient’s ability to deal practically and emotionally 
with his condition in an appropriate way) see Jansen and Sulmasy 
(2002), and Battin (2013), cf. my comments in….. Similar objec-
tions have also been made to pharmacological mood enhancement: 
“suffering from grief at the loss of a loved one is not the kind of… 
negative emotion one should want to ‘get rid of’ by means of a mood 
enhancer”, Schermer (2014), and cf. Olsen (2006).
30 See in particular Chochinov (2006), Chochinov et al. (2002, 2009).
31 Chochinov et  al. (2005). Cf. Chochinov et  al. (2011), reporting 
beneficial effects on patients’ level of well-being.
is structured by a series of interview questions, such as the 
following:
•	 Tell me a little about your life history; particularly the 
parts that you either remember most or think are the 
most important? When did you feel most alive?
•	 What are your most important accomplishments, and 
what do you feel most proud of?
•	 What are your hopes and dreams for your loved ones?
My problems begin when an instrument like this is 
called a ‘psychotherapy’ or a ‘non-pharmacological inter-
vention’.32 The very terminology shows that, although the 
suffering individual is supposedly addressed as a person, he 
really is only being treated as a patient, and his ‘feeling 
undignified’ as a symptom to be relieved. The method used 
to achieve this is to represent the patient’s life in the rosiest 
light possible, by focussing on the positive aspects of that 
life. Surely, it may be nice for you to be enabled to pass on 
the resulting document to your loved ones. More than 90% 
of the patients who consent to being interviewed welcome 
the opportunity. But perhaps your children would have pre-
ferred to receive a more honest assessment of your merits 
instead of this piece of self-advertising, maybe even a 
request for forgiveness for the ways in which you have 
made life more difficult for them, by your indifference or 
your relentless ambition. An instrument to pretty up your 
self-image is not necessarily the best you could give your 
children to remember you by.
It is important to strike the right balance here. I do not 
dispute that many people in the end stage of their illness 
are in a state of despondence that causes them to have a 
unduly negative image of their present and past selves. It 
will help them to be consoled, and counting their blessings 
may be a proper form of consolation.33 My point, however, 
is that not every negative assessment is an unduly negative 
one. This should be taken into account even in consoling 
patients. (Such realistic consolations may also be the more 
effective ones, but that is not my point).
The ‘dignity therapy’ turns out to be a kind of experi-
ence machine light, you could indeed imagine the same 
32 Similarly, some of the procedures, recommended by Chochinov 
(2006, 95ff). should be seen as requirements of humanity or profes-
sionality and not as ‘therapeutic interventions’ at all, for example ‘ask 
permission to examine patients’ or ‘treat the patient as worthy of hon-
our, esteem and respect’.
33 Cf. the story of Jacques in Chochinov (2003).
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result to be achievable by the administration of a drug. In 
many respects, it seems to me, opium is to be preferred.34
Some major elements of suffering
In order to flesh out the realistic approach we would have to 
consider in detail what it means in respect to some compo-
nents of suffering, described in terms of their intentional 
object, that on the evidence of the empirical studies seem to 
belong to the most important ones, both in terms of inci-
dence and of severity. I would, for example, have to discuss 
loss of hope as a dimension of suffering, and in particular 
the functional and inherent values and disvalues of false 
hope.35 My conclusion would be that there is often a better 
alternative to false hope than despair: acceptance. Actually 
at the moment of death most patients are at least resigned, 
if not reconciled to the fact.36 However, reflection and dia-
logue are required in order to achieve that stage, and when 
false hope is maintained too long, the remaining time to go 
through that process may become too short.
I would have to discuss loss of meaning and purpose, 
and in particular whether the personal value of a person’s 
life is enhanced by success in whatever she has set out to 
achieve in that life, even when this achievement is trivial or 
positively pernicious (Cf. footnote 23).
I would have to consider the common assumption of sui-
cidologists that it is always a pathological symptom to 
believe that you are a burden to others.37 As a matter of fact 
the belief may be fully warranted and you may have com-
pelling moral reasons to take the fact into account.38 The 
same point can be made about fears of future suffering. To 
reassure the patient about the possibilities of symptom 
management is important, but it should not come down to 
making false promises.39
In the remainder of this section, however, I will focus on 
two other dimensions of suffering, because considering 
them will enable me to point to some important limitations 
of the realistic approach I have advocated in this paper. 
These elements are often confused with each other, because 
34 Similar comments could be made to Wendy Duggleby’s Living 
With Hope Program, Duggleby et al. (2007).
35 For another recent purely functional approach to hope, see Olsman 
et  al. (2014). Interesting attempts to balance functional and realistic 
concerns have been made by Ruddick (1999), Musschenga (2015).
36 Mack et al. (2008).
37 See Den Hartogh (2016a) for further comments and references.
38 Den Hartogh unpubl.
39 One example of a functional approach to fear: Karlsson et  al. 
(2012).
both may be meant by terms such as ‘loss of autonomy’ or 
‘loss of control’.40 They should, however, be clearly 
distinguished.
For many patients it is a major element of their suffering 
that they no longer can take care of themselves, even for the 
most basic elements of self-care. They may be bedridden, 
perhaps incontinent, they may not even be able on their 
own to take food or drink, or to remove a fly that tickles 
their nose.
When this is a dominant element of a patient’s suffering, 
we might want to argue with him. Look, we might want to 
say, human beings are always vulnerable, every moment 
they may be the victim of an accident that makes them 
dependent on the compassion and care of others, good 
Samaritans or professionals. As the Stoics knew already, it 
is a matter of true independence to be able to cope with that 
condition, and with the cutbacks on privacy it implies, even 
to the point of being able to be thankful to your nurse, or to 
correct her if she is unduly paternalistic.41
It may occasionally make sense, in particular for an inti-
mate, to point this out. But I do not think that it is always a 
requirement of realism to do so. If a person has lived in an 
illusion of self-sufficiency all his life, and believes that it is 
abnormal or even humiliating to be dependent on the care 
of others, that is by now a relevant fact about his identity 
as a person. We would not make his life a better life (for 
him) if we somehow succeeded in preventing him to live by 
those values. We need not commit a relativistic fallacy—“it 
is good for him if he thinks it is”—to respect this element 
of his identity, in particular when we only enter his life in a 
professional role, as a doctor or a nurse. It would be disre-
spectful to try to educate him now, and it might add to his 
suffering, which, following Cassell, we should assess from 
his perspective.
The other major element of suffering that can be referred 
to by the term ‘loss of autonomy or control’, is the loss of 
coping resilience. That this is not identical to the loss of the 
ability of self-care, is shown by the fact that thát particular 
loss is one of the conditions that some people succeed in 
coping with. Suffering occurs when we understand our 
condition as threatening core aspects of our personhood, 
but in many cases people are able, with a lot of effort and 
almost always with the support of others, to mentally cope 
with that threat, to keep standing on their legs and walking, 
40 This is the most important reason for a request for physician assis-
tance to end one’s life in Oregon and Washington, Oregon Public 
Health Division (2014), Washington Death with Dignity Act Report 
(2014).
41 Cf. Boer (2012). Many Dutch doctors have some such uneasiness 
when aversion to being dependent on care is the patient’s main reason 
for requesting euthanasia, Van Tol et al. (2011, 132).
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however insecurely. You can come to accept the fact that 
you will die soon, that you will no longer be able to con-
tribute to causes that are dear to you, that you can no longer 
take care of yourself, and even that you are in a pitiful con-
dition to behold for others. But in other cases people do not 
succeed in this task. If that happens to you, you can be said 
to succumb to the attack on the integrity of your person. 
That shows that your coping resilience is itself the most 
central aspect of your personhood. There is an (inverse) 
conceptual relation between the perception of a threat to 
your personhood and your awareness of resources to cope 
with that threat, including hope, a sense of meaning, of 
self-worth, or of connectedness.42
Coping resilience may itself be very much assailed by 
physical and mental symptoms such as fatigue or frailty, 
physical and mental exhaustion, nervousness, confusion, 
concentration problems. For such reasons the patient may 
not be able to think clearly. If your condition is one that you 
haven’t been in before, if the task of handling it weighs 
heavily, and your coping abilities are curtailed, your auton-
omy will even more than usually be in need of being ‘scaf-
folded’ by the support of others.43 But this support will not 
aways be available and sufficient.
Some ways in which people try to adjust to their situ-
ation, sometimes resulting from obsessional personality 
traits, are inept, even counterproductive ones. This may be 
true of emotional states like frustration and anger, insist-
ence on improper forms of care or phobic avoidance of 
other forms. In such cases the functional and the realistic 
approach point in the same direction. Denial is also a very 
common coping strategy that in the end may lead to more 
rather than less suffering.
Precisely because coping resilience is an essential ele-
ment of intact personhood, it is the worst kind of suffering 
if you are overwhelmed by grief, despair, anxiety, anger 
and guilt.44 If that happens it would be pointless to insist on 
realism, to go on requiring you to take an appropriate atti-
tude even to that situation. If nothing else helps, mercy may 
require to sedate you. Some guidelines for Palliative Seda-
tion explicitly allow this, attributing to you (characteristi-
cally) a ‘refractory existential symptom’.45 Yes, sedation 
for these reasons may be considered the use of an experi-
ence machine, at least as long as sedation is only mild. But 
42 Krikorian et  al. (2012). The PRISM-measure of suffering (see 
Footnote 14) was orginally developed as a measure for coping ability.
43 Using a term from Joel Anderson, cf. Anderson and Honneth 
(2005), and MacKenzie (2008).
44 See characteristic statements of people with a low SIS in Büchi 
et al. (2002): “My illness is always there, it will never go away…it’s 
all my life, it’s like the end of the world”.
45 Including KNMG (2009) and Zorgnet Vlaanderen (2012). For dis-
cussion see Den Hartogh (2016b).
under these circumstances that use may be entirely 
warranted.46
Conclusion
What is basically at stake in this discussion is a normative 
conception of dying well. The functional approach rests on 
the ideal of a patient who is enabled to die in peace because 
both his physical symptoms and all other elements of his 
suffering are under full medical control. All deviations 
from this ideal are seen as defects, to be repaired as far as 
possible by therapy.47 Family support and spiritual care are 
both fully in the service of this aim. Every practititoner 
knows of course that this ideal is not always attainable, that 
not all suffering can be taken away. My point is that, even if 
that end could be achieved, we shouldn’t aim for it. Some 
aspects of suffering are beyond the legitimate scope of pal-
liative care, even if such care is understood, as it should be, 
in a personalized, relational and holistic way.
For many patients their main concern in this phase is to 
round off the story of their life in a fitting way. It can only 
be fitting if it continues to be sensitive to the world in which 
they lives as it is, even if this means recognizing highly 
disquieting facts for what they are. It is true that there is 
often a spectrum of responses that can be seen as appro-
priate to adverse circumstances, and it is also often hard to 
know what is an appropriate, let alone the most appropri-
ate response. Therefore in the search of an appropriate atti-
tude there is not only room for reflection and discussion but 
also for support and consolation. But these should, with the 
exceptions that I noted in the last section, remain within the 
constraints of realism.
At this stage it is almost always helpful to soothe persist-
ing physical symptoms of the terminal illness because they 
can no longer serve any beneficial function. But we 
shouldn’t conceive of all elements of suffering on the 
model of distressing physical symptoms, as phenomena 
that it is always in the interest of the patient to get rid of, 
whether by pills or by talk.48
46 Cf. Wijsbek (1999) about the circumstances in which it would be a 
good idea to hook on to Nozick’s experience-machine.
47 See also the Missoula-VITAS Quality of life index for patients 
with terminal illsness. (Byock and Merriman 1998, 243–244) The 
underlying ars moriendi is described in Byock (1996).
48 Cf. the WHO definition of palliative care: “an approach that 
improves the quality of life of individuals and their families facing 
the problems associated with lifethreatening illness, through the pre-
vention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and 
impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, 
physical, psychosocial and spiritual.” (see website WHO).
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Paradoxical though it may sound, suffering is a condi-
tion that, to some extent, requires to be respected as an inte-
gral part of dying well.
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